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THE LAW OF JUDICIAL NOTICE.
As a general principle of trial-practice courts are to be guided,
in reaching their conclusions, only by the evidence adduced in the
particular case and by the rules of law applicable to it. There are,
however, certain classes of facts which are not properly the subject
of testimony, or which are regarded as universally established by
common notoriety, and these, being held to rest within the knowledge of the judge, need not be proved in the case. Of such facts
the court is said to "take judicial notice." It is the purpose of
this article to describe in outline the chief subjects of judicial notice
and the principles by which courts are directed in taking official
cognisance of them.
I. Constitution and Laws of the United States.-In the first
place, courts are always presumed to know the laws under which
they act and which they are to administer. This is obviously essential to the first steps in judicial proceedings. And accordingly,
any branch or division of the body of the law which applies to the
territory within the jurisdiction of the court need not be established
as matter of fact, but will be officially noted. And since the Constitution of the United States, the public acts of Congress, and the
treaties made by the Federal Government with foreign nations form
a part of the "supreme law of the land," it follows that all courts,
whether national or state, will take judicial notice of their provisions.
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As to treaties, see United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103.
So state courts are bound to take notice of the internal revenue laws
of Congress, and to refuse to aid parties in any attempt to violate
them, whether the point is raised by counsel or not: Kessel v. Albertis, 56 Barb. 362. The same is true of national bankrupt laws
and their practical operation: Mims v. Swartz, 37 Texas 13. And
it has been held that the President's proclamation of " universal
amnesty and pardon" is a public act of which all the courts of the
United States are bound to take notice and to which they are bound
to give effect: Armstrong v. United States, 13 Wall. 154. So also
courts will take notice of the government survey and the legal subdivisions of the public land: Atwater v. Schenck, 9 Wis. 160. But
the state courts are not bound to notice the rules of the departments
of the federal government, or of the board of land commissioners or
surveyor-general, e. g., that original papers are not to be taken from
their files. Such rules, if essential, must be shown by affidavit or
otherwise: Hfensley v. Tarpey, 7 Cal. 288. Nor are courts required to know officially the various orders issued by a military
commander in the exercise of the military authority conferred upon
him : Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall. 519.
II. Public Laws of the State.-Since the common or unwritten
law of the state, together with its general and public statutes, constitute an integral part of the domestic jurisprudence, these also
are proper subjects for the judicial cognisance of the court : Lane
v. Harris, 16 Ga. 217. As also the time when a public law takes
effect: State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. And it is held that the appellate court, if in doubt as to the true reading of a statute, will
of its own motion inform itself thereof by referring to the original
act on file in the office of the secretary of state : Clare v. State, 5
Iowa 509. Whether or not the official knowledge of the court
should be understood to extend to the journals of the two houses
of the legislature, is a mooted question. It has been so held in
Alabama and Michigan: Moody v. State, 48 Ala. 115; People v.
Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; and denied elsewhere: Grob v. Cushman, 45 Ill. 119; Coleman v. Dobbins, 8 Ind. 156. But at any
rate it appears to be settled that when it becomes the duty of the
court to inquire into the validity or constitutionality of a statute,
recourse may be had to the legislative journals. The courts are required to be acquainted with the whole body of domestic law ; but
of course it is an essential prerequisite to such acquaintance that
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they should have knowledge of any acts which are invalid, unconstitutional, or not in force. The judges must be able to determine
whether or not a bill has been passed in accordance with all the constitutional provisions, .whether or not it received the requisite majority to pass it over the governor's veto, whether or not it answers the
law in respect to singleness of subject-matter and title, and so on;
and such de.termination becomes impossible unless reference can be
made to the official records of the legislative body. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; lIoody v. State, 48 Ala. 115; Opinion of
the Judges, 35 N. H. 579; Pangborn v. Young, 32 N. .1.Law 29.
But it is equally settled that the court cannot go behind the records
of the legislature to inquire into the regularity of their proceedings
in passing an act: People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269. On the whole,
we are inclined to favor the liberal and wise rule laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Gardnerv. The Collector, 6 Wall. 511: "We are of opinion, on principle as well as
authority, that whenever a question arises in a court of law of the
existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, or
of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called upon to
decide it, have a right to resort to any source of information which
in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear
and satisfactory answer to such question ; always seeking first for
that which in its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law
has enacted a different rule." But in considering the proceedings
of the legislature, the court has no judicial knowledge whether or
not there are proper and legitimate modes of expending money in
procuring the passage of an act; and therefore it cannot say that
an averment in an answer, of such expenditure, with such purpose
and result, is either immaterial or vicious: Judah v. Trustees, 16
Ind. 56.
Nor is the court restricted, in noticing the laws of the state, to
the allegations of the pleader. For example, where a bill concerns
the interests of the state and is professedly for their protection, the
court will take official notice. of the established law, even though it
contradicts such allegations: State v. Jarrett, 17 Md. 809. It
follows as a corollary from what has already been said that- the
court will take judicial notice of the repeal of any law of the state:
State v. O'Connor, 13 La. Ann. 486. Even where proceedings are
begun under a certain statute, and, pending an appeal, that statute
is repealed, the appellate court is bound to notice such repeal,
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though it forms no part of the case as reported for their judgment:
Springfield v. Worcester, 2 Cush. 52. The laws relating to highways are public statutes of which the courts will take judicial
notice: Town of Griswold v. Gallup, 22 Conn. 208. And the
same is true of bank-charters: Davis v. Bank of Fulton, 31 Ga.
69; though see Bank v. Gruber, 87 Penn. St. 468.
But private and special acts of the legislature, relating only to a
limited number of persons, are not laws of which the courts are required to take official cognisance. This rests upon two reasons.
In the first place, they are not matters of such, public notoriety
that judges are presumed to know them at all events. And
secondly, they are not in reality the public laws of the state, but
rather in the nature of a contract between the legislature, in their
representative capacity, and the individuals who are supposed to
derive benefit from them. Leland v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317;
Timlow v. Beading Railroad,10 W. N. C. 436; Bank v. Gruber,
87 Penn. St. 468; Legrand v. Sidney College, 5 Munf. (Va.) 324.
It is often essential to determine whether a given act is public or
private, and to this end the court in Indiana has laid down the
following rule: To constitute a statute a public act it is not necessary that it should extend to all parts of the state; it is a public
act if it extends equally to all persons within the territorial limits
described in the statute : Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281. Yet a special
act for the survey of a particular tract of land is not such a public
law as the courts are required to know judicially: City of Allegheny v. Nelson, 25 Penn. St. 332. And, as further illustrating
this distinction, it is held that while the court knows judicially all
the statutes under which plank-road companies are organized, yet
it cannot know judicially under which one any particular company
was formed, or whether it has not adopted the provisions of some
other act: Danville, &c., Co. v. State, 16 Ind. 456. In accordance
with the principles of the rule above stated, it is decided that an
act relating to the powers of a single municipal corporation is in its
nature public, though not in terms declared to be so, and must be
judicially noticed by the courts; Pauntleroy v. Hannibal, 1 Dill.
118. So also special laws enacted by a territorial legislature,
creating towns or cities municipal corporations, are public acts:
Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kans. 426. And the courts will take judicial notice of -the power and authority of a city to improve its
streets: Macey v. Titcombe, 1 9 Ind. 135 ; and that the streets of a
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city are public highways: Whittaker v. -EighthAve. Railroad Co.,
5 Robt. (N. Y.) 650 ; but not of the width of the streets or of the
side-walks, in a city, nor of the city ordinances establishing the
same or prescribing or limiting their extent: Porter v. Waring,
69 N. Y. 250. It is well settled that courts of general jurisdiction,
established by the authority of the state, cannot take judicial
notice of the city ordinances or police regulations of any municipal corporation: Case v. -Mfobile, 30 Ala. 538; Porter v. Waring, supra. iBut a city court will officially notice such ordinances;
because it stands in the same attitude towards the municipal laws
of the city that a state court occupies in reference to the public laws
of the state: State v. Leiber, 11 Iowa 407. It appears that private
laws, though requiring proof by evidence, need not be specially
pleaded,, but may be exhibited as other documents, unless admitted
by consent: Legrand v. College, 5 Munf. (Va.) 324.
III. International Law.-The law of nations, being co-extensive
with civilization, must also be judicially noticed by all courts.
Thus the law merchant, so far as the same is a part of the private
international law, is not a subject for proof as matter of fact, but
will be noticed and applied by the court: JYewel v. Centir, 25 Ala.
498. So also it has been said in Connecticut, "By common consent and general usage, the seal of a court of admiralty has been
considered as sufficiently authenticating its records. No objection
has prevailed against the reception of a decree of a court acting on
the law of nations when established by its seal. The seal is deemed
to be evidence of itself, because such courts are considered as courts
of the whole civilized world, and every person interested as a party."
Thompson v. Stewart, 3 Conn. 181. And the same is equally true
of the general principles of the laws of navigation. Thus, where
a set of rules of navigation (prescribing the different kinds of lights
to be used on vessels) has been issued by a foreign government, and
accepted as obligatory by more than thirty of the principal commercial nations of the world, the courts may take judicial notice of the
fact ,that by common consent of mankind these rules have been
acquiesced iii as of general obligation. The law maritime does not
require proof as a foreign law: The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170. So
also the national flag and seal of all civilized countries is recognised by the courts: Watson v. Walker, 23 N. H. 496. And to.
further illustrate the same principle-acts which are criminal by the
common law and the laws of all civilized countries will be pre-
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sumed to be contrary to the laws of any state of the Union: Cluff
v. M. B. Ins. Co., 13 Allen 308.
As a principle somewhat analogous to the preceding, it is held
that the official seal of a notary public is self-proving everywhere;
in other words, that the courts of one jurisdiction will take notice
of the authority of a notary public, commissioned in another state
to administer oaths and perform other duties incident to his official
capacity, without any other authentication than his signature and
notarial seal, and will infer therefrown that he was duly appointed
by the governor of such state: Denmead v. Manc, 2 McArthur
475: Browne v. PhiladelphiaBank, 6 S. & R. 484.
IV. Judicial Notice of State Law in the Federal Courts.Whenever questions arise in the courts of the United States which
depend upon points of state law, the adjudicating tribunals will
take judicial notice of all such laws: Merrill v. Dawson, 1 Hemp.
563; Jones v. Hays, 4 McLean 521 ; Mewster v. Spalding, 6 Id.
24; Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65. So the Supreme Court
will take official cognisance of any law of any state which may be
necessary to the determination of the questions before it, and the
circuit courts will notice the laws of all states within their territorial jurisdiction. This principle may rest upon either of two
foundations. (1.) "The circuit courts of the United States are
created by Congress, not for the ppirpose of administering the local
laws of a single state alone, but to administer the laws of all the
states of the Union, in cases to which they respectively apply :"
Owings v. Hull, 9 Pet. 625; and since, as we have already seen,
every court is presumed to know the whole body of the law which
it is intended to administer, it follows that these courts must be
acquainted with the state laws. (2.) In the contemplation of the
federal tribunals the states are not "foreign," but are all component
parts of the general government and territorially within its jurisdiction: Bennett v. Bennett, Deady 309.
In this matter the
United States courts are governed by the same rules which direct
the tribunals of the particular state; e. g. as respects the difference
between public and private statutes, and the fact that the latter cannot be judicially noticed. So, where a certain act of incorporation
is declared to be a public act, so that the state courts may include
it within their judicial notice, the federal courts will do likewise:
Covington -DrawbridgeCo. v. Shepherd, 20 How. 227. And so
of a statute giving a county authority to subscribe for stock in a
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railroad company, and to issue its bonds in payment thereof: Smith
v. Tallapoosa 0o., 2 Woods 574. To this rule, however, there is
an important exception, viz. : that while the courts of one state cannot generally notice the laws of a sister state, the judicial knowledge of a national court is not confined to the enactments of the
state where it happens to be sitting at the particular time, but extends at all times to the laws of all other states within its jurisdiction. For it would be absurd to make the scope of the judicial
knowledge shift and vary in correspondence with the venue of the
particular action.
As a general rule, when the proper construction of a state statute
has been fixed and settled by the court of last resort in that state,
the same construction will be adopted by the federal courts sitting
within her borders: Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152.
V. Lais of Sister States, how regarded.-It is a general rule
that foreign laws are matters of fact to be pleaded and proved. As
municipal laws have no extra-territorial force, they cannot be regarded, strictly speaking, as law when they are brought before a
tribunal foreign to the jurisdiction that enacted them. And the
only reason why such tribunals enforce them at all is, because it is
supposed that contracts made in foreign countries are made with
reference to the laws there prevalent, and that those laws have thus
become incorporated in such contracts. To enforce the contracts,
therefore, it is necessary to enforce the laws. But as they are not
proper subjects for the administration of the domestic tribunal, they
must be alleged as matter of fact, and their existence and tenor
must be established by testimony. Now the states of the American
Union, except in so far as it is otherwise provided in the federal
constitution, are regarded as independent sovereignties, and their
mutual relations as those of foreign powers in close alliance and
friendship. It follows from this that the laws of each state are "foreign" in the other states, and cannotbe judicially noticed, but must
be pleaded and proved as facts. This proposition is abundantly
supported by the authorities: State v. Stade, 1 D. Chip. 303;
Territt v. Woodruff, 19 Vt. 182; Hempstead v. Reed, 6 Conn.
480; M ine v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253; Ynapp v. Abell, 10 Allen
485; Ames v. eCamber, 124 Mass. 85; Miller v. Avery, 2 Barb.
Oh. 582; 1osford v. .Nichols, 1 Paige Ch. 226 ; -Dorsey v. .Dorsey, 5 J. J. Marsh. 280; Whitesides v. Poole, 9 Rich. (S. C.) 68;
Simms v. Southern Ex. Co., 38 Ga. 129; Shed v. Augustine, 14
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Kan. 282; Irving v. McLean, 4 Blackf. 52; Rothrock v. Perkinson, 61 Ind. 39 ; .Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 256; Careyv. Railroad, 5 Iowa 357; Brimhall v. Van Qampen, 8 Minn. 13; Rape
v. .Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, § 865.
But there are certain modifications which have been engrafted
upon this rule. Thus, where one state recognises acts done in pursuance of the laws of another state, its courts will take judicial
notice of those laws, so far as may be necessary to determine the
validity of the acts alleged to be in conformity with them : Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513. So also, where question arises
under the Act of Congress requiring that full faith and credit be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and proceedings of
every other state, the domestic tribunal will take judicial notice of
the local laws of the state from which the record comes; for the
-verysensible reason that their proceedings, in such case, are subject
to review in the Supreme Court of the United States, and since in
that court the states are not regarded as foreign, and their individual laws are officially noticed, the same rule should obtain, under
these circumstances, in the state courts. As remarked by WooDWARD, J., "It would be a very imperfect and discordant administration for the court of original jurisdiction to adopt one rule of
decision, while the court of final resort was governed by another;
and hence it follows that, in questions of this sort, we should take
notice of the local laws of a sister state in the same manner the
Supreme Court of the United States would do on a writ of error
to our judgment:" State of Ohio v. Hinchman, 27 Penn. St. 479;
Paine v. Insurance Co., 11 R. 1. 411 ; Rae v. Hfulbert, 17 Ill.
572; Butcher v. Bank, 2 Kans. 70. It has been said, in Georgia,
that the judges, on the trial of a cause, may proceed on their personal knowledge of the laws of another state, and that their judgment will not be reversed, in consequence of their so doing, unless
it appears that their decision was erroneous as to those laws:
.Hersehfeld v. Dexler, 12 Ga. 582. But this seems to. be an isolated case. As showing the practical operation of this rule, we
may cite the following: The courts cannot judicially know the rate
of legal interest in a sister state: Clarke v. Pratt, 20 Ala. 470 ;
Dorsey v. Dorsey, 5 J. J. Marsh. 280; nor what share would fall
to a given heir of an intestate who died domiciled in another state:
McDaniel v. Wright, 7 J. J. Marsh. 475; in an action on a cantract made in another state, and specifying no particular place of
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performance, the court will not, on a demurrer to the declaration,
take judicial notice of a law of such state which, applied to the
contract, would render it void: Jones v. Palmer, 1 Dougl. (Mich.)
379 ; an averment of lis pendens in the courts of another state
does not necessarily import that the defendant has appeared or been
served with process, and hence is not a good plea in abatement:
Newell v. Newton, 10 Pick. 470.
Another important exception to the rule that the laws of one
state are foreign to the courts of another and must be pleaded and
proved, is found in the fact that where one state is formed out
of territory originally belonging to another, the courts of the new
state will recognise as a part of their domestic jurisprudence all
laws of the other state which were in force at the time of the
separation, unless repealed, directly or by implication, in the new
state. Thus the courts of Kentucky will take judicial notice of the
laws of Virginia existing before the former state became independent of the latter: Delano v. Jopling, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 417. And
the same is true of states which were formerly within the dominion
of foreign nations. So the Spanish laws which prevailed in
Louisiana before its cession to the United States, and upon which
the titles to land in that state depend, must be judicially noticed
and expounded by the courts of Louisiana: United States v. Turner, 11 How. 663. So also our courts will take judicial notice of
the statute law of Great Britain in force before the separation; but
the statutes of that country created since the revolution cannot be
judicially noticed or established before our courts, except in the
same manner and by the same proofs as the criminal laws of any
foreign state: Ocean Avzs. Co. v. Fields, 2 Story 59.
VI. ForeignLaws-How Proved.-The laws of any foreign state
or country being thus seen to be without the judicial cognisance, we
are next to consider the methods of proving them before the court
when they become material to the controversy. A concise rule has
been laid down by the United States Supreme Court, as follows:
"The existence of a foreign law, written or unwritten, cannot be
judicially poticed, unless it be proved as a fact, by appropriate
evidence. The written foreign law may be proved by a copy of the
law properly authenticated. The unwritten must be proved by the
parol testimony of experts :" -Ennisv. Smith, 14 How. 426; Frith
v. Sprague, 14 Mass. 455. In regard to the written law, and first
as to the mode of authenticating it, it is held that the great seal of
VOL. XX-III.-71
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a state affixed to the exemplification of a law is sufficient proof
of itself, inasmuch as the public seal is a matter of notoriety
and will be judicially noticed as a part of the law of nations
acknowledged by all: _obinson v. Gilman, 20 Me. 800; State v.
Carr, 5 N. H. 867. And it has been decided by the supreme
federal tribunal that, under the Act of May 26th 1790, prescribing
the manner in which the public acts, records and proceedings of the
several states shall be authenticated, no other authentication of an
act of the legislature is required than the annexation of the seal
of the state; and it is presumed that the person *who affixed the
seal had competent authority to do so: United States v. Amedy, 11
Wheat. 392. In regard to foreign countries; however, it is essential
that the person certifying the exemplification of the law should be
one whose duty and prerogative it is to do so. Thus, it is not a
consular function to authenticate the laws of a foreign state, and
the certificate of a United States consul to that effect is not evidence: (Jhurch v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187. And again, "the
certificate and seal of the minister resident from Great Britain in
Hanover is not a proper authentication for the proceedings of a
foreign court, or of the proceedings of an officer authorized to take
depositions. It is not connected in any way with the functions
of the minister. His certificate and seal could only authenticate
those acts which are appropriate to his office :" Stein v. Bowman,
18 Pet. 209. The general rule, then, is that the exemplification
must be under the great seal of the state. As between the several
states of the Union, however, a more liberal rule obtains. In
general, the written laws of a sister state may be proved by printed
volumes, printed by the authority of such state, and purporting to
contain the public acts of its legislature. In point of fact, this
rule is dictated by principles of convenience, and affords a method
of proof more satisfactory even than that by certified copy. It
may now be regarded as established in a majority of the states.
Thus it is said in Pennsylvania: "Printed volumes purporting to
be on the face of them the laws of a sister state, are admissible as
prima facie evidence to prove the statute laws of that state :"
Mullen v. Morris, 2 Penn. St. 87. And in Massachusetts it is
held that where a printed volume of the laws of another state
contains the words "By authority" on the title-page, that is a
sufficient authentication to allow it to be introduced in evidence:
Merrfield v. Bobbins, 8 Gray 150. In New Hampshire it was
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once said that such printed volume was admissible if, according to
the testimony of a counsellor of that state, it was there cited and
received by the courts: Lord v. Staples, 23 N. H. 448 ; but a
later decision holds it sufficient if it purports on its face to be
printed by authority: Emery v. Berry, 28 N. IL 487. And see,
to the same effect, Thomas v. Davis, 7 B. Mon. 227; Clanton v.
Barnes, 50 Ala. 260; Barkman v. Hopkins, 11 Ark. 157; State
v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60; Simms v. Southern Ex. Co., 38 Ga. 129;
Rothrock v. Perkinson, 61 Ind. 39; Bradley v. West, 60 Mo. 34.
A contrary doctrine is held in North Carolina : State v. Twitty, 2
Hawks 441. Whether or not a similar authentication is sufficient
for the statute law of a foreign country is a question not yet
entirely decided; but the current of judicial opinion seems to
require that the volume offered to prove such laws must be shown,
by extraneous evidence, to be duly authorized by the government
of the foreign country. Thus, a printed copy of the Irish statutes,
when supported by the oath of an Irish barrister to the effect that
he had received them from the king's printer in Ireland, and that
they are good evidence there, may be used to show the laws
of Ireland: Jones v. Maffet, 5 S. & R. 523. So, also, where a
printed volume of the laws of a British province is shown by the
testimony of witnesses to have received the sanction of the
executive and judicial officers of the province, as containing its
laws: Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147. But an act of the Parliament
of Great Britain cannot be proved by an alleged transcript of it in
the "Canada Gazette," although the latter is an official newspaper:
Beach v. Workman, 20 N. H. 379.
It is generally settled that the common or unwritten law of a foreign state may be proved by parol evidence of experts. And to
constitute one an expert, for this purpose, it is not necessary that
he should be a lawyer, provided it appears that he has been in a
position which might reasonably be supposed to require familiarity
on his part with such laws. Thus it is said: "The law of a foreign
country on a given subject may be proved by any person who, though
not a lawyer, or not having filled any public office, is or has been
in a position to render it probable that he would make himself acquainted with it;" American, &c., Co. v. .Rosenagle, 77 Penn. St.
515; Hgall v. Costello, 48 N. H. 179. The construction given to
a statute of a foreign state, by usage and by judicial decisions, is
a part of its unwritten law, and should be proved by the testimony
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of experts: Dyer v. Smith, 12 Conn. 384.

In Massachusetts it is

provided by statute that the books of reports of cases adjudged in
the courts of other states are admissible in evidence to prove the
unwritten law of those states : Cragin v. Lamkin, 7 Allen 395;
Ames v. McCamber, 124 Mass. 91.
While it is firmly settled that foreign laws must be proved as
facts, there is much diversity of opinion as to whether the proof
of them should be addressed to the court or to the jury. On the
one hand, it is the province of the jury to decide upon questions of
fact. On the other hand, it is the undoubted prerogative of the court
to rule upon matters of law.
Judge STORY (Conflict of Laws,
§ 638) says : " The court are to decide what is the proper evidence
of the laws of a foreign country; and, where evidence is given of
those laws, the court are to judge of their applicability, when proved,
to the case in hand." And the same rule has been asserted in New
Hampshire: Pickard v. Bailey, 26 N. H. 152. But in Massachusetts it is held that the construction to be put upon foreign laws
after they are proved is a question for the jury, with such instructions to assist them in ascertaining and applying the law as may be
deemed proper: Hiolmanv. King, 7 Met. 384. And again: " When
the evidence consists of the parol testimony of experts as to the existence or prevailing construction of a statute, or as to any point of
unwritten law, the jury must determine what the foreign law is, as
in the case of any controverted fact depending upon like testimony.
* * * Where the evidence admitted consists entirely of a written
document, statute, or judicial opinion, the question of its construction and effect is for the court alone :" Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass.
254. Perhaps the rule that is most closely in accordance with both
reason and elementary law is that laid down in the following language: "The existence of a foreign law is a fact. The court cannot judicially know it, and therefore it must be proved; and the
proof, like all other, necessarily goes to the jury. But when established, the meaning of the law, its construction and effect, is the
province of the court. It is a matter of professional science; and,
as the terms of the law are taken to be ascertained by the jury,
there is no necessity for imposing on them the burden of affixing a
meaning on them, more than on our own statutes. It is the office
of reason to put a construction on .any given document, and therefore it naturally arranges itself among the duties of the judge."
State v. Jackson, 2 Dev. (N. C.) 563. These latter views are logi-
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cally, ably, and dogmatically supported by the learned author of
Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, Vol. L, § 419.
VII. Presumption that the Foreign Law is the same as Our
Own.-We frequently see it stated that the law of any foreign
country is presumed to be the same as our own. This means that
where a contract, or other-matter in dispute, is on its face to be
governed by a foreign law, and no proof of that law has been adduced, and it is not such that the court can take judicial notice of
it, the adjudicating tribunal will proceed upon the basis of its own
laws, not being informed in what respect the foreign law differs, or
presuming, within certain restrictions, that it is identical. Thus,
as a general rule, it is presumed that the "1common law" prevails
in each of the United States: Monroe v. Douglass, 5 N. Y. 447;
Whitford v. Panama Railroad Co., 23 Id. 465; Copley v. Sandford, 2 La. Ann. 335; Rape v. BHeaton, 9 Wis. 328; 1 Whart.
on Ev., § 314. In illustration of this rule, it is held that chainperty, being an offence at common law, is to be presumed to be
against the law of another state, the contrary not appearing:
Thurston v. Percival,1 Pick. 415. Again, in Massaohusetts the
giving of a promissory note is evidence of payment of a pre-existing debt-the law will be presumed the same in Maine: -Ely v.
James, 123 Mass. 44. Whether or not the statutes of another
state are presumed the same as ours is a question propounded, but
not decided, by the New York court in the case of McCulloch v.
Norwood, 58 N. Y. 563. Probably not; since foreign statute-law
is so easily susceptible of proof.
There are several exceptions to this rule of presumption. In the
first place, it is plainly in accordance with natural justice that all
contracts and judicial proceedings had abroad should be presumed
legal and valid, until the contrary is shown. Hence, if a contract,
made with reference to foreign laws and to be governed thereby,
would be void or illegal by the law of the forum, the court will not
presume the foreign law to be the same as the domestic, for the
mere purpose of defeating the contract, but on the contrary, in
the absence of proof, will understand the contract to be valid by the
foreign law. In other words, the presumption of legality and
validity is stronger than the presumption of identity of laws:
1 Bishop on Mar. & Div., § 412; 1 Whart. on Ev., §§ 314, 1250;
For example, if the
Jones v. Palmer, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 379.
defence is usury, and the contract would be usurious under the
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domestic law, the court will not presume that the lex loci contractus
is identical and so overthrow the contract; the defendant must
prove the foreign law as matter of fact: Campion v. Kille, 15 N.
J. Eq. 476 ; Cutler v. Wright, 22 N. Y. 472; Davis v. Bowling,
19 -Mo. 651. So also courts will not take judicial notice of the
revenue laws of another country : Randall v. Rensselaer, 1 Johns.
94. So where suit was instituted upon a promissory note made in
Jamaica by one who was under age, and no evidence was offered of
the laws of Jamaica, it was held that the court would not presume
those laws to be the same, in respect to minority as a defence, as
the laws of the forum, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover:
Thompson v. KYetcham, 8 Johns. 190. In the second place, this
presumption cannot reasonably be extended to countries whose
usages and customs are wholly different from ours, and whose
system of laws has nothing in common with our own jurisprudence,
either in respect of origin, traditions or theories. Thus there is
no presumption that the common law is in force in Russia: Savage
v. O'Neil, 44 N. Y. 298. Nor among the Cherokee nation: Duval
v. Marshall, 30 Ark. 230. Nor in Turkey: Dainese v. Bale, 91
U. S. 13. Nor, finally, can the presumption of identity of laws
be attached to any local idiosyncrasies or peculiarly intra-territorial
regulations. As remarked by a distinguished writer, "It would
be preposterous to assume, even prima facie, that our Statute of
Frauds, or our fluctuating liquor laws, or our laws for the collection
of revenue, prevail in Japan." 1 Bishop M. & D., § 412. And
by another: "Nor can a judge, as to a notoriously peculiar domestic rule, assume without absurdity that such rule obtains in a sister
state." 1 Whart. on Ev., § 315. In conclusion of this part of
our subject, it is held that where a statute of another state has
once been recognised as the law of that state by a decision of the
domestic courts, the latter will thereafter take judicial cognisance
of the statute, and until it be proved that the law has been changed,
will presume it still in existence: Graham v. Williams, 21 La.
Ann. 594.
VIII. Judicial.Notice taken of other Courts and their Judges.
-As a general rule, all courts in the United States will take judicial notice of the fact that tribunals are established in the several
states for the adjustment of controversies and the ascertainment of
rights: Dozier v. Joyce, 8 Port. (Ala.) 303. But in regard to
recognising particular courts in other states, the practice is not so
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harmonious. Thus the courts of Kansas will take judicial notice
of the constitutions of sister states, and in an action on a judgment
of the Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania, will recognise the
fact that bsj the constitution of that state that court is a commonlaw court haviung original and appellate jurisdiction: Butcher v.
Brownsville, 2 Kans. 70. On the other hand, the courts of Wisconsin will not take judicial notice that there are county judges in
New York or that they are authorized to administer oaths : Fellows
v. Menasha, 11 Wis. 558. Of course all courts will officially recognise those which are superior to them or co-ordinate "with them,
and their practice. And it may now be regarded as settled that
appellate courts will take notice of the inferior courts and who are
their judges: Tucker v. State, 11 Md. 322; IKilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Penn. St. 198. But see Bipley v. Warren, 2 Pick.
596. So the circuit court will take judicial cognisance of who are
the justices of the peace for the county in which it is held, and
will require no proof of their official character unless that particular
point is directly in issue: Cqambers v. People, 5 Ill. 351; Hibbs
v. Blair, 14 Penn. St. 413. And the Supreme Court of a state
should take notice of the times prescribed by law for holding the
terms of the various courts of the state: Lindsay v. Williams, 17
Ala. 229; McGinnis v. State, 24 Ind. 500; -Davidsonv. Peticolas, 34 Tex. 27. But the superior courts will not take judicial
notice of the customs, rules, practice or proceedings of inferior courts
of limited jurisdiction, unless justice requires it, when revising the
judgments of such courts: March v. Commonwealth, 12 B. Mon.
25. Or unless, we may add, the organization and practice of such
courts is regulated by statute, in which case it would be included in
the judicial knowledge which the court has of all the laws of the
state. In California it is stated that where a party relies upon the
rules of practice of the district courts he must have them incorporated in the record, as the Supreme Court cannot judicially notice
them: Cutter v. Caruthers, 48 Cal. 178. The court will always
take judicial notice of all prior proceedings in a case; hence it is
unnecessary to offer evidence of a former trial and the verdict returned on such trial, on the hearing of a plea in bar of "once in
jeopardy" by such trial and verdict: tate v. Bowen, 16 Kans.
475. And where an appearance is entered in the inferior court,
and is not withdrawn, and an appeal is taken to this court, and the
judgment below is reversed and remanded, and, after proceedings
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there, another appeal is taken to this court, this court will judicially
know what attorneys have appeared in the cause : Symmes v. 31ajor
21 Ind. 443.
IX. Executive and other Officers.-The courts of a state are
presumed to know who the state executive may be at any time when
the fact may be called in question: Dewees v. Colorado County,
82 Texas 570. So it will be judicially noticed that a certificate,
indorsed on the bond of a county treasurer by the deputy auditorgeneral of the state, was so indorsed by an officer of the state :
People v. Johr,22 Mich. 461. And the same is true of the officers
of a county. Thus courts will officially notice th appointment or
election of sheriffs, as well as of other executive or administrative
officers, and treat them as officers de facto when the validity of their
acts is called in question in a collateral manner; Thompson v. Haskell, 21 Ill. 215; Dyer v. Flint,Id. 80. So of tax-collector and
his signature: Wetherbee v. Dunn, 82 Cal. 106. And of the
genuineness of the signatures of the county officers and of such
deputies as the law authorizes: Rimmelmann v. Hoadly, 44 Cal.
213. But see, as a peculiar case, Shropshire v. State, 12 Ark. 190.
It is well settled that a court may take judicial notice of who are
its own officers: Dyer v. Last, 51 Ill. 179. And also of the
genuineness of its own records and of the signatures of its own
officers: State v. Postlewait,14 Iowa 446.
X. Historical Events.-All courts are presumed to have an official knowledge of general history, and they will require no proof
of events and circumstances which were of such universal notoriety
and affected so large a proportion of the population, at the time of
happening or afterwards, that they may be regarded as a part of
the public history of the country. Further than this it would be
extremely difficult to lay down an affirmative principle of distinction.
Such matters are judicially noticed by reason of their notoriety;
and Wharton's description of notoriety is as follows : "Evidence is
not needed to establish that which is so notorious to persons of ordinary intelligence that it either admits of no doubt, or could at
the moment be established by a profusion of indisputable testimony:"
Law of Evidence, Vol. I., § 380. As illustrations of this public
notoriety, though not as embodying a principle of distinction, may
be cited the following instances: The separation of the Methodist
Church, in 1844, into two bodies north and south of a line, was an
event that connected itself with and formed a part of the history
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of the country, and hence will be judicially noticed: Humphrey v.
Burnside, 4 Bush (Ky). 215. The courts of Alabama will officially notice the fact, as a part of contemporary history, that in 1867
the people of that state were in a condition of great financial embarrassment and insolvency, and that in consequence of such state
of affairs it may not have been practicable for a guardian, at that
time, to make a safe investment of a large sum of money, without
some delay after its receipt: Ashley v. JIfartin,50 Ala. 537. The
court will judicially notice the agreement between Lord Baltimore
and William Penn relating to the boundary line between the iwo
provinces, as it is a part of the public history of Pennsylvania:
Thomas v. Stigers, 5 Penn. St. 480. So also the history of the
Six Nations of Indians is a part of the history of New York of
which the courts will take judicial notice, as well as of the extinction of the Indian title to a certain tract of land within the state:
Howard v. Moot. 64 N. Y. 271. But it is said that while courts
will judicially notice matters of public history, yet it is generally
necessary to produce some evidence upon the point sought to
be established, as by contemporary chronicles, &.: .McKinnon v.
Bliss, 21 N. Y. 206.
XI. The Course of Nature.-In the next place, it is well settled
that judicial notice will be taken of the ordinary course of nature
and the rotation of the seasons ; and so of the general course of
agriculture, with reference, for example, to the maturity of the
crops: Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. 286. So a court will take notice
without proof that a mortgage made in January upon a cotton crop
is upon a crop not yet in being: Tomlinson v. Greenfield, 31 Ark.
557. But on the other hand, it cannot be judicially known to the
court that the concentric layers in the trunk of a tree mark each a
year's growth of the tree and thus indicate its age : Patterson v.
llrCausland 3 Bland (Md.) 69. Nor can notice be taken of mere
vicissitudes of climate or of the seasons or special alternations of
weather: Dixon v. Nicholls, 39 Ill. 372. So it is said that the
almanac has long been regarded and held as a part of the law of
the land. And the court will notice the coincidence of days of the
month with days of the week, as shown by the almanac: Allman
v. Owen, 31 Ala. 167. As. if a bill or note bears date on a certain
day of the month, the court will judicially notice if such day were
Sunday: 1 Daniel on Negot. Instr., § 70. And further, the court
will take judicial notice that the date on which a judgment by
VOL. XXXI.-72
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default was recorded in a given year was or was not a day of a term
such that the same was not prematurely rendered: Bethune v.
Bale, 45 Ala. 522. Moreover, the ordinary limitations of human
life are a proper subject for judicial cognisance. For example,
where it is evident, from the time of their ancestor's death, that
his children must have arrived at full age before suit was commenced,
the court will judicially notice such fact: Floyd v. Johnson, 2 Litt.
(Ky.) 109.
XII. Geographical Features and Civil Divisions.-Courts are
bound to take judicial notice of the leading geographical features
of the country ; but the minuteness of such knoW'ledge is inversely
proportional to the distance, being much more specific and detailed
in regard to the territory over which the court has jurisdiction than
with respect to foreign lands or even different states. Thus courts
will be presumed to be acquainted with the great geographical features of the states-such as lakes, rivers and mountains, and of the
division of the state into counties, cities and towns, and their relative position: Winnipiseogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420
Hinckley v. Beckwith, 23 Wis. 328; Goodwin v. Appleton, 22
Me. 453; Martin v. Martin, 51 Id. 366. And of the navigability
of streams: Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257. But not of the
precise boundaries and distances, nor of the local situation and distances of the different places, in counties from each other: Goodwin v. Appleton, supra. But the area of an established county is
known to the court without proof: Commissioners v. Spitler, 13
Ind. 235.
In regard to the names of towns and their situation, (a controverted point), it was said in Illinois that where the premises in
litigation were described as "lot five in block one in Haley's addition to the city of Monmouth," the Supreme Court would take
judicial notice that there is a city of Monmouth in Warren county,
Illinois, and would presume that to be the city intended: Bardiz.q
v. Strong, 42 Ill. 148. But it is the general rule that the higher
courts of the state can only notice those civil divisions which are
established and prescribed by the legislature. Thus the Supreme
Court of Indiana cannot judicially know the names of the townships
composing a given county, for the townships are established by the
board of county commissioners, not by the legislature: Bragg v.
Rush County, 84 Ind. 406. However, it is permitted them to
notice that the state and the township are distinct political organiza-
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tions: La Grange v. Chapman, 11 Mich. 499. As to how much
knowledge is required of points outside the state, the decisions are
not entirely harmonious. It has been held that the courts cannot
officially know of the existence of a town or city of a specified
name, as New Orleans, New York, Janesville, not lying within the
state; Riggin v. Collier, 6 Mo. 568 ; Woodward v. Railroad, 21
Wis. 309; Whitlock v. Castro, 22 Tex. 108; Richardson v.
Williams, 2 Port. (Ala.) 239. But these decisions are not satisfactory, and it is difficult to conceive any substantial reason why
courts should be presumed ignorant of the existence and location
of those well known centres of traffic and commerce which are so
familiar in the every-day parlance of private individuals. And see
Rice v. Montgomery, 4 Biss. 75. At any rate, it is apprehended
that this restriction could not be applied to the courts of the United
States ; for the reasons given above for their judicial knowledge of
the laws of various states. And the more important geographical
features of the United States, considered as one country, xiay be
judicially noticed; e. g. that the state of Missouri is east of the
Rocky Mountains: Price v. Page, 24 M6. 65. In regard to the
length of time required to make a railway journey, or for carriers
to transport goods, from one designated city to another, the prevailing doctrine seems to be that a court will require proof, not being
able to determine officially what time should be allowed : Rice v.
Montgomery, supra. But in a recent Pennsylvania case it was
said: "We apprehend that the ordinary speed of railway trains is
a matter for judicial cognisance, and hence a very simple calculation will demonstrate with approximate certainty the time within
which mails may be transported between such cities as New York
and Pittsburgh ;" and hence an instruction that "there was nothing
improbable in the idea that a notice of protest could reach Pittsburgh the day following the maturity of the note," was not erroneous ; although " perhaps the learned [trial] judge went too far in
stating that a train leaving New York at five or six in the evening
would reach Pittsburgh the next morning at eight:" Pearcev. Langfit, 101 Penn. St. 512. And in another instance the court took
judicial notice of the usual duration of voyages across the Atlantic
by steam or other packet ships, so far as to determine that one who
was proved to have taken passage on a particular vessel, which
vessel had not yet been heard from after a great lapse of time,
must be dead: Oppenheim V. Wolf, 3 Sandf. Ch. 571.
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There are but few cases illustrating the rules of judicial notice as
applied to the geographical features of foreign countries, but those
cases exhibit an unexpected liberality. Thus the Louisiana court
once tobk notice that the river Mersey in England is filled with salt
water, the tide ebbing and flowing therein to a great height : Whitney v. Gauche, 11 La. Ann. 432. And in the case of The Peterhoff, Blatchf. Prize Cas. 463, the court even went so far as to take
judicial notice of the situation of a town in a foreign country, and
that a bar exists at the mouth of the river on which that town lies,
which vessels of the draught of the ship in suit cannot cross.
XIII. Customs and Usages.-Whenever a custom is public, general and notorious, it will be judicially noticed by the court -ithout proof. This is true, for example, of the custom of merchants
to charge interest on their accounts after six months: Koons v.
Killer, 3 W. & S. 271 ; Watt v. Hoch, 25 Penn. St. 411. And
so of ordinary and familiar abbreviations, such as "admr" for
"administrator :" Moseley v. Mastin, 37 Ala. 216. But not where
the custom is confined to a particular trade; with which the court
cannot reasonably be supposed to be acquainted. Thus the court
cannot know officially the meaning of printers' marks at the foot
of an advertisement, and, in the absence of further proof upon the
subject, will not infer that such marks indicate the date and number of times a notice has been published : Johnson v. Bobertson, 31
Md. 476. The court will take judicial notice of the wages of ordinary labor: Bell v. Barnet, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 516.
XIV. Matters of Political.Economy and Conclusions of Science.
-The different classes of notes and bills in circulation as money at
a particular time will also be judicially noticed : Bart v. State, 55
Ind. 599. It is in accordance with this principle that the Massachusetts court said: "We must take notice, in common with the
people, that bank notes derive their value not only from the certainty but the facility of payment; consequently that a man in
trade in Boston, holding a bill issued by a bank at a distance from
Boston, can less easily obtain payment than he could if the issuing
bank was near to him: and that the different facility of procuring
payment of different bills may create a difference in their value :"
Jones v. Pales, 4 Mass. 252. The courts will also recognise the
legal coins made at the United States mint pursuant to law, and
such foreign coins as are made current by law. Hence, in prosecutions for counterfeiting, it is not necessary to prove that there are

